I describe my personal evolution as a modeller of behaviour, both human and (non-human) animal behaviour, using dynamic state-variable models. At first I worked in renewable resource Economics, especially the economics of marine fisheries where I collaborated extensively with Gordon R. Munro. Subsequently, in collaboration with Marc Mangel (and many field biologists) I worked in Behavioural Ecology. Mathematical models have played a major role in both of these subjects, but until recently mostly static models were used, on the grounds that dynamic (not to mention stochastic) models were too difficult to work with. I express the hope that our use of relatively simple (but not too simple) dynamic models has established the fact that such models can be extremely helpful, perhaps essential, in understanding many aspects of behaviour.
natural population, such as a population of fish or other organisms. To explain this notion, Watt used the so-called Ricker model (Ricker, 1954) , which is often applied in the management of Pacific salmon populations (Box 1).
As a pure mathematician, I had little experience with mathematical models. For information of any reader unfamiliar with such objects, a mathematical model usually consists of one or more equations intended to mimic some real world system, typically in a deliberately simplified way. Mathematical models of the dynamics of exploited fish populations have been the basis of fisheries management since the 1950s (e.g. Beverton and Holt, 1957) . How this works is that, once an appropriate model has been formulated, its parameter values need to be estimated, for example by using historical catch and escapement data for the fishery in question. Next, one uses mathematical calculations to determine the optimal (in some sense) harvesting strategy, which can then be implemented.
Food for Thought articles are essays in which the author provides their perspective on a research area, topic, or issue. They are intended to provide contributors with a forum through which to air their own views and experiences, with few of the constraints that govern standard research articles. This Food for Thought article is one in a series solicited from leading figures in the fisheries and aquatic sciences community. The objective is to offer lessons and insights from their careers in an accessible and pedagogical form from which the community, and particularly early career scientists, will benefit. The International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) and Oxford University Press are pleased to make these Food for Thought articles immediately available as free access documents.
As Watt (1968) explained, the most desirable (i.e. optimal) harvesting strategy is often specified as the strategy that results in the maximum sustained yield (MSY)-see Box 1. MSY was long accepted as the ideal management strategy for marine fisheries, although criticisms thereof sometimes arose (e.g. Larkin, 1977) . For the Ricker model the optimal escapement population is S ¼ S MSY , as given by Equation (2). Note that this just maximizes the sustained yield FðSÞ À S. Any level of escapement smaller than S MSY is considered to constitute overfishing. (These concepts need to be revised for species with overlapping generations-see Beverton and Holt, 1957.) My own interest in the subject was kindled by a footnote in Watt's book, pointing out that the Ricker model was devoid of economic content, the inclusion of which could increase the model's relevance. Although completely ignorant of Economics (as well as Biology), I took this as a challenge. I had learned from an undergraduate course in Financial Math that the value of a stream of future payments P 1 ; P 2 ; . . . was calculated as a discounted present value,
where i denotes a specified discount rate, per period. For example, the cost of repayment of a mortgage in mid-term would be calculated in this way (in which case i would usually be called the interest rate).
For the case of a fishery, P k would represent the value of the harvest H k in period k (but I now write k ¼ t where t ¼ 0; 1; 2; . . . as in Equation 1). For the want of anything better, I assumed that P t ¼ pH t , with a constant price p, so that PV ¼ X 1 t¼0 pH t ð1 þ iÞ t (3) which represents the current value of the fishery, given the sequence of current and future harvests H 0 ; H 1 ; H 2 ; . . .. (and in the 1970s, unrealistic) assumption that the harvesting of fish is controlled by some central authority, perhaps a private owner or a coastal nation.
Now comes a crucial
The mathematical question I faced was, given an initial recruitment level R 0 , what present and future harvest strategy fH t g would maximize PV?
My first guess was that MSY would still be optimal -how could one do better than perpetually maximizing the harvests? So, being a trained mathematician, I set out to prove it. Surprise! The intuitive solution is wrong. The correct result is that escapement S should satisfy
The proof of this result appears in Box 2.
I soon realized that Equation (4) has some surprising, and possibly devastating implications. Assuming that the stockrecruitment function FðSÞ is convex (i.e. F 0 ðSÞ is decreasing-a reasonable assumption), Equation (4) implies that
This says that, with future discounting, the "optimal" harvest strategy always results in overfishing (if i > 0). Even more shocking, if the discount rate i exceeds the population's intrinsic growth rate F 0 ð0Þ, then Equation (4) has no solution and the "optimal" escapement is S ¼ 0, i.e. extinction! Can this really be correct? And does it explain why overfishing of marine populations has been so prevalent? As it turns out, things are not quite so simple, as I will explain shortly.
First, though, what is the intuitive explanation for this result? Rather than concentrating on the mathematical equations, let's consider an actual (but simplified) example, Antarctic blue whales. Imagine that the current population, e.g. as of 1965, is 10 000 whales (out of an estimated pre-whaling population of 150 000). Suppose the products of a single whale are worth $5000, so immediate harvesting to extinction would pay off $50 million cash. Suppose also that the sustainable annual harvest is equal to 5% of the stock, i.e. 500 whales per year, worth $2.5 million per year. Which harvest strategy is preferred? This is just the sort of decision that investors-and society at large-frequently face. Consume or invest? If the return on the available investment exceeds the interest rate, then invest; Box 1. The Ricker model. The Ricker stock recruitment model of population dynamics is:
where R t denotes the recruitment of harvestable fish in generation t ðt ¼ 0; 1; 2; . . .Þ; H t denotes the amount of the harvest taken from R t and S t is the escapement of spawners, whose eggs result in the subsequent generation, R tþ1 (the spawners die after spawning). The function FðS t Þ specifies the relationship between spawners S t and subsequent recruitment R tþ1 . Ricker (1954) proposed a specific functional form for F; but I do not make use of it here. It can be shown by elementary Calculus that the escapement level S MSY that results in the MSY satisfies
where F 0 denotes the derivative of F.
Box 2. The discounted present-value model. To prove Equation (4), suppose that an initial harvest H 0 is taken in the first period ðt ¼ 0Þ, and that sustained harvesting will be used for t ! 1. If S denotes the sustained escapement level, then H 0 ¼ R 0 À S and H t ¼ FðSÞ À S for all t ! 1. Putting these expressions into Equation (3), and summing the resulting geometric series (I write p ¼ 1 for simplicity):
Maximizing this (by Calculus) implies Equation (4).
Modelling the behaviour of fishers and fishes otherwise consume. The whalers would prefer to exterminate blue whales if their discount (interest) rate exceeds 5% p.a. Although oversimplified in many ways, this example at least reveals that renewable resource harvesting is a problem in capital and investment-a subject of central interest to economists! Yet, as I will now explain, the economic theory of the fishery that was in vogue in the 1970s almost entirely ignored this aspect.
I have long considered Equation (4) as the first "eureka" moment of my new research career. Of course, I figured that it must be a widely known result in resource economics, so I checked up on the literature in that area. How did resource economists explain overfishing (e.g.), and what was their proposed optimal harvest strategy?
I soon encountered a frequently cited paper in fishery economics, written by a Canadian economist, H. Scott Gordon, and titled "The economic theory of a common-property resource: the fishery" (Gordon, 1954) .
Gordon's model is diagrammatic, consisting of two curves, revenue and cost, both as functions of the input variable E ¼ fishing effort. The revenue curve R ¼ RðEÞis an inverted U-shape, namely R ¼ pY ðEÞ where Y ðEÞ is the sustainable yield-effort curve used by biologists, and p is the price of fish. The cost CðEÞ ¼ cE is assumed to be linear. Gordon explained that, while most revenue curves shown in economics textbooks display increasing functions, here RðEÞ attains a maximum value (corresponding to MSY) and then decreases for larger E, as a consequence of overfishing at high effort levels.
Gordon predicted that the unregulated fishery would settle at an equilibrium level given by RðEÞ ¼ CðEÞ, i.e. where pY ðEÞ ¼ cE
The unique solution E ¼ E to this equation he named "bionomic equilibrium." The argument supporting this prediction was simply this: for any effort level E < E the fishery is profitable, so additional fishermen will be enticed to enter; likewise E > E cannot persist for obvious reasons. Thus an equilibrium can only exist at E. The excess of revenue over costs, i.e. pY ðEÞ À cE is called "economic rent" by economists. Thus Gordon's prediction is that an unregulated common-property fishery will lead to the dissipation of economic rents, at equilibrium.
Like most readers, I found this argument compelling. Nowadays bionomic equilibrium would be recognized as a Nash competitive equilibrium (Nash, 1951) , or perhaps an instance of the "tragedy of the commons" (Hardin, 1968) . The widespread occurrence of severe overfishing in marine fisheries provides at least qualitative evidence supporting Gordon's theory. Indeed, several populations have been harvested to extinction (Dulvy et al., 2003) , which goes beyond the predictions of the Gordon model.
In any event, bionomic equilibrium certainly appears to be strongly suboptimal, since positive sustained economic rents can be achieved with effort levels E < E. The obvious questions are, what effort level E Ã is economically optimal, and how could this be achieved? Gordon (1954) suggested that the optimal effort would maximize sustained economic rents pY ðEÞ À cE, so that
This he called MEY (maximum economic yield). Note that necessarily E* < E MSY , a fact emphasized by Scott Gordon and later economists; it was pointed out that economists were more conservationist than biologists. It was even asserted that because a private owner of a fishery would use effort E Ã , he would never overharvest the resource, except perhaps by error. (If you have not made a sketch, now would be a good time to do so.)
Notice that Equation (6) is in direct contradiction with Equation (4)! This is because Equation (4) implies that S* < S MSY , whereas Equation (6) implies that E* < E MSY which in turn implies that S* > S MSY . When I presented my future-discounting model at a colloquium, some economists in the audience said they knew that Equation (6) was correct so Equation (4) must be wrong. "Where is the cost term in your model?" they asked. When I repeated that I had unfortunately ignored costs, the economists Box 3. A bioeconomic model of the fishery. The combined, bio-economic model is based on the following general-production model introduced by Schaefer (1954) :
hðtÞ ¼ qEðtÞxðtÞ (8) Here xðtÞ denotes the biomass of a given fish population at time t (t ! 0), and hðtÞ denotes the catch rate. The function value GðxÞ equals the natural net growth rate of the population, and G is assumed to take on an inverted U-shape (the prototypical example being the logistic function GðxÞ ¼ rxð1 À x=K Þ). In Equation (8), EðtÞ denotes fishing effort at time t, and q is a constant called "catchability." In practice EðtÞ would be identified with the current fishing activity, e.g. the number of currently active standardized fishing vessels. The net revenue flow generated by fishing is given by RðtÞ ¼ phðtÞ À cEðtÞ ¼ ðpqxðtÞ À cÞEðtÞ (9) where p and c are price and cost parameters, respectively. The present value of net revenue is
where d > 0 is the instantaneous discount rate. We assume that effort EðtÞ is constrained by 0 EðtÞ E maax (11) where E max is determined by fleet capacity.
Note that the bioeconomic model uses six parameters: r, K, q, p, c, and d:Determining the optimal effort strategy EðtÞ is, mathematically speaking, a problem in Optimal Control Theory: see Clark (2010) , p. 62.
said "No wonder. Put costs in and you'll always get S Ã > S MSY ." I was pretty sure this was incorrect, and so it turned out to be.
So what is going on here? My future discounting model ignores costs, while Gordon's model ignores . . . what? It ignores future discounting, which is to say that it ignores the cost of time. Equations (4) and (6) are both correct under their own assumptions. Both must be incorrect when the two costs are included.
In 1972, I was able to combine both types of costs in a general bio-economic model of a fishery (see Box 3). This model treats the fish population as a single variable x ¼ xðtÞ; representing the biomass of the population at time t; this is called a "generalproduction" model, and has been used in managing tuna and other fisheries.
It is important to emphasize that the bio-economic model described in Box 3 is a dynamic state variable model. The resource stock xðtÞ occurs explicitly in this model, in sharp contrast to Gordon's input-output diagrammatic model, in which the resource population is completely suppressed. The formulation and analysis of dynamic state variable optimization models was the basis of my research program for the rest of my career.
For example, the net revenue expression in Equation (9) implies that net revenue is only positive if x > c=pq, and Gordon's argument then implies that an unregulated open-access fishery will drive xðtÞ down to this level, which we therefore denote as x BE , i.e. bionomic equilibrium. Note that bionomic equilibrium is now specified as a state (i.e. size) of the resource, rather than a certain effort level.
The optimal harvest strategy for the new model is described in Box 4.
I will not discuss the implications of Equation (12) here in any detail. The two previous models (future-discounting, Gordon) arise as special cases, with c ¼ 0 or d ¼ 0; respectively. Also, it can be shown that
and x Ã is a decreasing function of d (higher discounting implies less resource conservation). In addition we have
This says that at very high discount rates, the "optimal" harvest strategy results in almost the same outcome as for an unregulated fishery. It can certainly happen that x Ã < x MSY , provided that
But what is the significance of all this theory, if any? First of all, if a certain fishery is to be managed at all, the management authority will presumably adopt some specified objective if it is only "to prevent overfishing." In the first place, however, there must actually exist a management authority having the power to control fishing. This central authority can only be a fishing nation, or perhaps a coalition of fishing nations. It was this realization that led us to the establishment of 200-mile coastal fishing zones, or EEZs, in the 1970s.
Let me next discuss briefly the implications of Equation (13), particularly for the case of an initially depleted stock, xð0Þ < x Ã . The last line in Equation (13) says that the optimal strategy is a complete fishing moratorium until the stock has recovered to the optimal level x Ã . This may seem impractical, as the fishers would be unemployed (and their vessels idled), possibly for an extended period of time (the longer the lower the discount rate).
In fact, this extreme proposal is model-dependent; under alternate assumptions, a complete moratorium is not optimal. This point is discussed in greater detail below.
I wrote an article based on the above model, and submitted it to Science, where it was published in 1973 under the title "The Economics of Overexploitation" (Clark, 1973) . It seems that this paper established me as authority on fishery economics (which was far from true, as I explain shortly). Also, since I used the Antarctic whaling industry as my main example, I also suddenly became a world authority on that fishery. For example, I was invited to an international meeting of whale biologists held at Monaco in 1975, and then to a large UN-sponsored meeting on marine mammals in Bergen (1976) .
I think the reason that I became an overnight expert on whale economics was just that no one else had tried to do it. As one prominent fisheries economist said to me, "Why on earth did you decide to study the economics of whaling?" Except that I was too dumbfounded to reply, I might have pointed out that whaling was one of the most lucrative marine fisheries ever (see Clark and Lamberson, 1982) .
In 1973, I decided that I needed to learn some real Economics, so I asked the UBC economist Anthony Scott if I could audit his graduate course on resource economics. He agreed, provided that I didn't keep interrupting with "mathematical niceties." Another auditor was Gordon Munro, an economist who had been working in Malaysia, where he was asked for some economic advice Box 4. The optimal strategy. The optimal effort strategy for the bioeconomic model of Box 3 is as follows. First, there exists an optimal equilibrium biomass level x Ã , which is determined by the equation
where cðxÞ ¼ c=qx (which is the cost of a unit harvest when the population biomass equals x). Equation (12) can be derived from an argument resembling that given in Box 2. The dynamically optimal effort strategy is to use maximum effort E max when xðtÞ > x Ã ; and zero effort if xðtÞ < x Ã :
In other words, the optimal effort strategy is to use EðtÞ to transfer the population xðtÞ as rapidly as possible to its long-term equilibrium at x Ã . The complete proof of these results appears in Clark (2010) , p. 24. (Certain assumptions about GðxÞ are needed to ensure the correctness of this solution.) regarding government fishery subsidies. Tony invited me to present my model in class, and then also asked Gordon to describe the Malaysian subsidy problem. After both talks, Gordon came to my office to suggest that perhaps my model could be used to address his problem, which had the unusual feature that the price p paid to fishers would suddenly decline in the future when the subsidy was removed.
I thought about this for a while, and phoned Gordon the next day to explain the solution. One day later Gordon phoned back to thank me, but to inform me that my solution was incorrect. He was right, of course-I had neglected something important. As Gordon explained, if it is known that the price p will drop at some future date then it makes sense to harvest more intensively while the price is still high, even though harvesting will be reduced after the price change. We eventually came up with the correct solution, and this was the beginning of many years of collaboration. Our first joint paper, titled "The economics of fishing and modern capital theory: a simplified approach," was published in 1975 (Clark and Munro, 1975) . It included the model described above, and discussed various extensions, including the subsidies problem.
An important insight deriving from this research was that, from the economic point of view, any resource stock can be considered as a form of capital-natural as opposed to manufactured capital. This concept is now fairly widely accepted (e.g. Jansson et al., 1994) .
Gordon and I have continued to collaborate and publish on fisheries economics, and we have both (independently) published books (Clark, 2006 (Clark, , 2010 Bjørndal and Munro, 2012) . We were delighted when in 2016 we were elected Fellows of IIFET, the International Institute of Fisheries Economics and Trade. Our invited paper, "Capital theory and the economics of fisheries: implications for policy" was published in Marine Resource Economics (Clark and Munro, 2017) .
In 1975, I took a break from my sabbatical in Australia and attended a meeting (on whales!) at the University of Indiana. The "father" of fishery economics H. Scott Gordon was in the Economics department there, so I made a point of meeting him. Over lunch I asked how he, an economic historian, had become interested in fisheries. He said that one day an official of the Canadian Department of Fisheries had asked him if he could explain, in economic terms, why Canadian fishers were always poor, no matter how much the government helped them. Responding to this question led to Gordon's (1954) paper. "How long (Gordon then asked me) do you think it took me to write it?" When I said maybe a year, he was delighted-apparently most people think the idea is obvious. Not me-I have often found that a simple, convincing explanation can take a long time to think up.
I was slated to give the colloquium talk that afternoon to the Math department, so I asked Scott if he would please attend. He agreed (a bit reluctantly), and I introduced him to the audience as the author of the seminal paper in fishery economics, which was recognized as a great paper in terms of explaining overfishing, but not so good as a dynamic model of optimal fishing.
In the question period after the talk, Scott stood up to say "Until now I haven't really understood Colin's Science paper, but now I do get it. My 1954 article completely ignored future discounting, a serious error which I now regret."
So why was it that Scott Gordon's simple model and its implications were so long accepted as gospel by fishery economists?
The model was charmingly-and convincingly-simple, just a standard microeconomic input-output model of the kind that every student of economics is familiar with. Obviously (it seems) the economic optimum occurs where the net revenue (gross revenue minus cost) is maximized, i.e. MEY in the jargon (see Equation 6 ). Furthermore, if a certain fishery happens to be at bionomic equilibrium E (where net revenue equals zero), then it again seems abundantly obvious that everyone (i.e. the fishers) would be better off if effort were to be reduced, ideally to the MEY level. So what's wrong with this argument?
Please pause to answer this question before reading on. To make the argument even more convincing, assume that E > E MSY , so that reducing E to E MSY , e.g. would simultaneously increase the catch rate and decrease the cost of fishing. Is this correct?
I hope you have passed the test. If not, don't worry-many have failed! Here's a clue that something must be wrong. Reducing effort (from E) will increase the catch? Really? How does that happen? According to Equation (8) of Box 3 we have h ¼ qEx, so reducing E will reduce h proportionally, right?
Here is where the light goes on for many students (and dare I say for Scott Gordon?). Reducing E will certainly reduce the catch rate h over the short run, but this reduction in h will cause an increase in the biomass xðtÞ over the long run. If E began at E, the new effort level E < E (if maintained indefinitely) will eventually result in a new equilibrium on the Gordon diagram, at which sustained revenue will indeed exceed the sustained cost. But achieving this new equilibrium will take time, possibly an inordinate amount of time. Somehow or other this detail got overlooked by the whole community of fisheries economists from 1954 to 1975 and beyond. Once you understand this point, it becomes obvious that a dynamic optimization model is absolutely essential for further progress. Box 3 to the rescue!
Regulation of fishing
In 1979, I participated in a conference-workshop, organized by the Canadian Department of Fisheries and Oceans, on the economics of commercial fishery regulation. The latter had become an important issue following the establishment of 200-mile fishing zones in the late 1970s. I remember standing up during a panel discussion, to say that I would be happy to collaborate with someone in formulating a dynamic model of a regulated fishery. "That's the last thing we need, another model," a voice said. Of course, my view was that that was the first thing they needed, namely a model of an individual fisher's behaviour, based on the assumption that fishers would attempt to maximize their shortterm economic gains, subject to any imposed (and enforced) regulations. This behavioural sub-model can then be inserted into a dynamic model of the fish population, leading to predictions about the effects of alternative regulation schemes. In the end, I constructed such a model on my own (Clark, 1980) . For example, consider the commonly used method of TACs (Total Allowable Catches) plus seasonal closures. The TAC is set and the fishery is closed for the year once this catch bas been taken. Imagine that this method is introduced into a fishery currently at bionomic equilibrium. The TAC is set lower than the unregulated catch would be so the fish population begins to recover from overfishing. Consequently fishing becomes profitable, so the behavioural model predicts that total fishing capacity will then increase. A new, "regulated bionomic equilibrium" will arise, with higher fishing capacity and low, near-zero economic rents. To prevent overfishing, the regulators are forced to progressively shorten the fishing season (Wilen, 1985) .
Readers familiar with marine fishery management will recognize that such scenarios have occurred in many managed fisheries. In the Pacific halibut fishery, for example, TAC-type management eventually led to a fishing season of $6 days per year (Munro et al., 2009) . Bjørndal and Munro (2012) refer to TACs as an "incentive blocking" approach to fishery management. Other incentive-blocking methods include gear restriction and limited entry programs.
In contrast to incentive-blocking are "incentive-adjusting" methods of regulation, such as taxes and allocated individual quotas (IQs). IQs have the additional feature that fishers (i.e. quota holders) have an economic incentive to protect the resource for future harvesting. Conceivably, the harvest strategy preferred by the quota holders could differ substantially from that preferred by the management authority, i.e. the central government. This difference might well arise from a difference in the rate of future discounting used by the two participants. At any rate, it can certainly not be assumed (as was once the case) that IQ owners would never wish to overharvest the resource. Central government control over the total allowable catch will always be paramount.
Stock rehabilitation
In the discussion of the above bio-economic model, I noted that the optimal harvest strategy for a currently depleted stock (xðtÞ < x Ã ) consists of a fishing moratorium (EðtÞ ¼ 0) until the stock recovers to the optimal level. Is this extreme strategy really optimal in practice? Not necessarily: it arises here as a consequence of two tacit model assumptions, (a) that the price of fish is a fixed constant and (b) that idled vessels and fishers have equally profitable opportunities elsewhere. The first assumption is discussed in Clark and Munro (1975) -if small catches can sell at higher prices, then harvesting at a low rate should continue unless the stock is severely depleted.
The second tacit assumption occurs in the cost term cE of Equation (9); these are variable costs. Hence any fixed costs, such as the cost of fishing vessels and gear, are left out of consideration. An extension of the previous model that includes fixed costs is given in Box 5. The extended model has two state variables, fish stock or biomass xðtÞ as before, and fleet size K ðtÞ, which limits fishing effort (Equation 14). The resulting dynamic optimization problem is to determine the combined investment and effort strategies that maximize PV.
This problem turns out to be extremely difficult mathematically, and Gordon Munro and I required the assistance of my colleague Francis H. Clarke, who is an expert in optimal control theory (see . I will skip the details here, but just comment that there once again exists an optimal equilibrium stock level x OEY (depending on all model parameters), but the optimal adjustment strategy from an initial stock x 0 is not the simple, most-rapid approach strategy of the previous model. For example, if x 0 < x OEY then stock rehabilitation is optimal, but not with a fishing moratorium. Details are in the cited paper; see also Clark (2010) , Chapter 4.
The next collaborator I wish to acknowledge is Marc Mangel. I first met Marc Mangel in 1975 when he attended my course on Optimal Control Theory, which I was teaching while Frank Clarke was on leave. The next year I took Marc on as a research assistant for a US National Marine Fisheries Service contract to study the effects of schooling behaviour of tropical tunas on the tuna fishery. Marc soon turned out to be a collaborator rather than just a research assistant. This work led to a joint paper, published in the Fishery Bulletin (Clark and Mangel, 1979) .
After obtaining his PhD in Applied Mathematics (supervised by my colleague Donald Ludwig), Marc went to work for the US Navy, where he worked on search theory, a topic of much interest to the Navy. But Marc also retained an interest in fisheries, so it was natural that we should continue our collaboration by modelling the searching behaviour of fishers. We kept in touch by mail (no email, yet), interchanging complicated equations. The outcome, titled "Uncertainty, search, and information in fisheries," was published in 1983 in the ICES journal (Mangel and Clark, 1983) .
Well, one thing leads to another. I remember asking Marc one day if he had heard of Optimal Foraging Theory? Foragers often have to search for their prey, so perhaps our article on search by fishers just re-stated known results. We quickly checked the literature-no problem! Existing optimal foraging theory was mainly deterministic, dealing with long-term averages. That is, foragers were assumed to use behavioural strategies (e.g. in patch choice, and diet selection) that maximized their long-term average net energy gain. Our first paper, entitled "Foraging and flocking strategies: information in an uncertain environment," was published in the prestigious ecology journal The American Naturalist (Clark and Mangel, 1984) . In this paper we predicted that foragers Box 5. Fixed costs. To include the fixed cost of fishing vessels in the model of Box 3, let us now assume that effort EðtÞ is limited by vessel capacity K ¼ K ðtÞ:
Here K ðtÞ denotes the number of (standardized) vessels available in the given fishery at time t. We suppose that vessel capacity can be increased by new investment IðtÞ, and is reduced by depreciation at rate c:
Finally, we make the extreme assumption that vessels, once purchased, cannot be sold at a positive price, so that
Equations (14-16) are now added to our dynamic model. The present value function becomes
where c 1 is the variable cost of effort and c f is the fixed cost of vessel capital.
would often form groups ("flocks") that were larger than the optimal size; in the language of Behavioural Ecology, supraoptimal group size was often the Evolutionary Stable Strategy. Our argument, which resembled the argument for overfishing by human predators, was at that time not widely realized as appropriate for natural predators (foragers); see also Clark and Mangel (1986) . It eventually dawned on us that the mathematical framework that we were using, called Markov Decision Processes, would apply to any type of animal behaviour. The discipline of Behavioural Ecology, which was then barely 20-years old, used optimization models, but they were mostly static. To mention one example, it was often considered impossible to model foraging and anti-predator behaviour simultaneously, because the corresponding "fitness currencies" (energy, survival) were incompatible. We realized that this difficulty can be overcome by using a dynamic optimization (Markov) model, with fitness specified as expected lifetime reproduction. Our 1986 paper "Towards a unified foraging theory" set out to explain this idea; see also McNamara and Houston (1986) .
Soon after that paper appeared I received a phone call from Ronald Ydenberg, a behavioural ecologist at neighbouring Simon Fraser University. Ron told me that he was organizing a workshop at SFU on dynamic modelling of animal behaviour. Alasdair Houston (from Oxford), who would be attending the workshop, had asked Ron whether Colin Clark would be there. "Who?" said Ron, but he quickly agreed to phone and invite me too. The plan of the workshop was to have a few field ecologists describe their observations of behaviour, after which Alasdair and I would show them how to construct an appropriate dynamic model. Neither of us had any experience with such a venture but we were anxious to give it a try. I don't recall the details of any of the models we invented on the spot (I later collaborated at length with Ron Ydenberg), but I do remember that I grew increasingly excited about the opportunity to make a significant theoretical contribution to a rapidly growing new research area.
After the workshop, Alasdair flew from Vancouver down to Davis, CA, to visit Marc Mangel. Two days later I called up Marc Mangel, and seriously proposed that, together with John McNamara, we should write a paper on the prospects for dynamic modelling in ecology. The resulted, titled "Dynamic models in behavioural and evolutionary ecology," was published in Nature (Houston et al., 1988) .
I will end by describing two such models, one developed by Marc and the other by me. Marc's model concerned reproductive strategy, and mine pertained to migration. Both were based on existing data, which the dynamic models explained in novel and convincing ways.
Marc had come across a paper by Charnov and Skinner (1984) , who reported on experiments that measured the reproductive success of clutches of eggs laid by the parasitic wasp Nasonia vitripennis on host pupae of various sizes. They defined the fitness increment of a given clutch as the number of surviving offspring produced, and hypothesized that natural selection should lead to the strategy of laying fitness-maximizing clutches of eggs on each host encountered. Let us refer to this as the "single host maximum" (SHM) clutch size.
The experimental data showed that the wasps usually laid clutches that were equal to or smaller than the SHM, with the majority of clutches being much smaller than that. No explanation for the discrepancy was suggested.
Marc decided to set up a dynamic optimization (Markov decision) model; see Boxes 6 and 7.
Upon carrying out this calculation for the wasp model, Marc found that the optimal clutch sizes were always less than or equal to the SHM, and mostly a lot smaller. The Monte Carlo simulation produced a scatter diagram of clutch size versus host volume that closely resembled the experimental data of Charnov and Skinner (1984) . He told me later that at first he considered this too good to be true so he tried to find a bug in his computer code! But there was no bug-the result was correct.
Within a couple of days the explanation became clear. Charnov and Skinner's measured fitness functions were concave: W i 0 ðcÞ < 0: This implies that, e.g. laying two clutches of one egg each is better than laying one clutch of two eggs. Hence if hosts are abundant, and time is unlimited, the optimal strategy is to lay single-egg clutches. Otherwise somewhat larger clutches may be optimal-but nothing is ever gained by exceeding the SHM (Mangel, 1987) . I consider this to be an elegant discovery. True, it's obvious with hindsight, I suppose, but remember what I said about "obvious" explanations earlier.
Marc's model made several testable predictions. For example, wasps will lay smaller clutches when hosts are abundant. Also, they will increase their clutch size if the current weather suggests that the summer season is about to end. Such predictions were in fact later upheld experimentally. Marc has continued to collaborate with several entomologists.
Box 6. Oviposition model. The state X t of a female wasp at the start of period t is defined as the number of mature eggs remaining in her body; female N. vitripennis do not produce additional eggs over their life span. Thus the dynamic equation is simply
where C t denotes the number of eggs laid in period t.
Mangel assumed that hosts of various sizes would be encountered randomly, and that a wasp would face a per-period mortality risk q t . The fitness increment from each clutch W i ðC t Þ was the quantity measured by Charnov and Skinner. Finally, and this is crucial, a wasp's total lifetime fitness is specified as the expected sum of all fitness increments over 1 t T . This is the customary notion of Darwinian fitness. Thus the optimization problem is
where i, a random variable, represents the type (size) of host encountered in period t, and E denotes mathematical expectation. The method of solution of this problem is discussed in Box 7.
On a personal note, I never cease to be amazed at the behavioural capabilities of animals, including insects. As predicted by Marc's dynamic model, not only can a parasitic wasp assess the size of encountered host pupae, but she also adjusts her clutch size to current circumstances such as host density, time of the season, and her own egg supply. Models-and discoveries-like this have laid waste to the claim that mathematical optimization models are a "waste of time" to quote one author.
Note, by the way, that Mangel's oviposition model is stochastic-the wasps encounter host pupae at random. Randomness and uncertainty are present (and important) in most behavioural problems. The method of stochastic dynamic programming (SDP) allows one to include stochastic aspects fairly easily (although ultimately the value function usually involves averaging in some way).
In 1987, I taught a course to graduate students in Ecology on dynamic modelling. One of the students was David A. Levy, who was doing a PhD thesis on Diel Vertical Migration (DVM) of juvenile salmon in various BC lakes. The salmon spend daylight hours in deep water, and migrate to surface water to feed on zooplankton for short periods at dusk and dawn. Dave was not satisfied with the commonly accepted explanations for DVM (e.g. salmon need time to digest their food; they wish to avoid overexploiting their prey, etc.), and hypothesized that DVM involved some sort of trade-off between foraging and predation risk. He hoped that a dynamic model might help in understanding such a trade-off.
I began by designing a simple model of a fish searching for randomly distributed prey (see Box 8).
We need to consider the juvenile salmon as participating in two predator-prey contests; as predators in the salmon-copepod interaction, and as prey in a trout-salmon interaction. So there are two feeding-rate functions, say f 1 ðrÞ and f 2 ðrÞ; imagine them plotted on the same graph.
How do they differ, and what causes the trade-off? Specifically, from estimating parameter values for a typical B.C. lake, we found that the inflection points are around 1 cm for salmoncopepods, versus about 1 m for trout-salmon. (The reason for this difference is that the density q 1 for copepods is much larger than the density q 2 for salmon.) This implies that the foraging efficiency for trout falls off sharply when the visual range drops below 1 m, while the foraging efficiency for salmon remains high until visibility falls to 1 cm. Of course, the salmon's risk of predation is proportional to the foraging rate of the trout population.
Box 7. Solution method. First we define a time-dependent function Fðx; tÞ as follows: Fðx; tÞ is the wasp's maximum expected remaining lifetime fitness from period t to T; given that X t ¼ x. We can then calculate Fðx; tÞ numerically (using the computer) by the method of SDP as follows. For simplicity, assume that the wasp will die before period T ; so
For any t < T we have
where k i is the probability that the wasp encounters a host pupa of type i per period (we include k 0 for the probability of not encountering any host pupae; thus W 0 ðcÞ ¼ 0). Equation (21) is called the dynamic programming equation, or Bellman's equation. The derivation of Equation (21) is fairly direct. In period t (t < T ), the wasp encounters a host of type i with probability k i (multiple encounters are assumed not to occur). She then lays a clutch c (0 c x), obtaining fitness increment W i ðcÞ, and reducing her egg complement to x À c. Her remaining expected lifetime fitness from t þ 1 on, is by definition Fðx À c; t þ 1Þ. The optimal clutch maximizes this sum. We now use "backwards iteration" to determine the optimal clutch size c Ã i ðx; tÞ. Namely, starting with t ¼ T À 1, the second term in Equation (21) drops out, and we find c Ã i by numerical search of the values W i ðcÞ (this is just the SHM). This specifies Fðx; T À 1Þ for each x ¼ 1; 2; . . . ; x max . Next, we repeat this process for t ¼ T À 2, and so on. Finally, having obtained the optimal clutch strategy we run Monte Carlo simulations (forward in time) to deduce the distribution of clutch sizes. A similar procedure (adjusted according to the specifics of a particular model) is used for all other examples; details are described fully in our two books Clark and Mangel, 2000) .
Box 8. A model of fish searching for prey. Assume a swim speed v, handling time s per prey item, average prey energy content h;prey density q, and visual range r. Consider the cylindrical search volume generated by the salmon per unit time. It is easy to show that the average feeding rate is
where
Here v; s; h , and q are constant parameters for the system in question, and r is a variable, depending on the time of day (which affects light intensity). The graph of f ðrÞ is ogive-shaped, withf ð0Þ ¼ 0 and f ðrÞ ! h=s as r ! 1. It has an inflection point at r ¼ Q= ffiffi ffi 3 p .
We called this time interval, which occurs twice a day, the "antipredation window" (Clark and Levy, 1988) . Empirical evidence supporting our theory has been provided by Scheuerell and Schindler (2003) . The dynamic optimization model, based on the above feedingrate model, is straightforward, and I skip the details. Like many other species, sockeye salmon juveniles are faced with a dilemma-they must eat to grow and survive, but feeding exposes them to the inevitable risk of predation. The optimal feeding strategy balances these selective forces, and a dynamic, lifetime fitness model is needed to understand how this works out. Not surprisingly the optimal foraging strategy consists of surface feeding within two daily windows, at dawn and dusk. (The salmon further reduce their risk of predation by foraging in groups). Basically, the young salmon should just forage enough to reach the critical size for downstream migration. It's using the antipredation window that is the important point. To achieve the necessary growth at minimum risk of predation the salmon make use of the anti-predation window.
Conclusions
The modelling framework that I and my collaborators settled on was dynamic state-variable optimization models, generally known as Markov Decision Process models. This class of model is sufficiently broad to cover a wide range of phenomena, including topics in resource management and behavioural ecology. In the former case, the state variable is the resource stock itself, while for animal behaviour studies it refers to the state of the animal. The optimization objective function is discounted economic benefits in the first case and lifetime fitness in the second.
The large literature on Markov Decision Processes is readily approached via the web. My books with Marc Mangel Clark and Mangel, 2000) explain how to formulate and use these models.
